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ABSTRACT
The Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) plays a central role in safe navigation 
of ships. The ECDIS is basically a software package running on a general operating system that could 
be comprised of the third-party components. This paper presents an analysis of cyber security 
weaknesses of a shipboard ECDIS raising from the ECDIS software’s third-party components. The 
analysis is based on the cyber security testing of the shipboard ECDIS using an industry vulnerability 
scanner. Detected vulnerabilities are analysed regarding the protection measures implemented on 
the ship. The results suggest that even the type approved ECDIS system with maintained ECDIS 
software and the underlying operating system could be vulnerable due to weaknesses in the ECDIS 
software’s third-party components.
1 Introduction
The Electronic Chart Display and Information System 
(ECDIS) has significantly changed the ship navigation by 
providing real-time navigational information and reduc-
tion of workload from paper charts (Brčić et al., 2019), 
and thus enhancing the efficiency and safety. The ECDIS 
development for about three decades into the complex 
computer-based system has raised a need to protect the 
safe navigation from cyber threats (Svilicic et al., 2019a; 
Tam and Jones, 2019; Svilicic et al., 2019b; Hareide et al., 
2018; Kessler et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2017). Therefore, 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has imposed 
to include cyber risk assessment in the International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code by the 1st January 2021 
(IMO, 2017a). As well, additionally to the published gen-
eral guidelines for managing maritime cyber risks (IMO, 
2017b), IMO in collaboration with the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is developing a 
new related standard for maritime navigation and ra-
diocommunication equipment and systems, IEC 63154 
“Cybersecurity – General requirements, methods of testing 
and required test results” (IEC, 2019). 
The ECDIS is basically a software package with stand-
ardized functionality by IMO performance standards (IMO, 
2017c), which is running on a general operating system 
from a different manufacturer than the system itself. It has 
been shown that the ECDIS underlying operating system 
is a source of major cyber threats (Svilicic et al., 2019b; 
Svilicic et al., 2019c). However, most of the today`s soft-
ware is comprised of third-party components, which are 
developed by an entity other than the manufactures of the 
software or the underlying operating system. While the 
usage of the third-party software components allows for 
acceleration and cost reduction of the development proc-
ess, vulnerabilities existing in these components can rep-
resent a critical threat for the system functionality.
In this paper, cyber security of a shipboard ECDIS is 
tested in order to analyze cyber threats rising from the 
ECDIS software third-party components. The tested ECDIS 
was recently implemented on the training and research 
ship Kraljica mora of the Croatian Ministry of the Sea, 
Transport and Infrastructure (Figure 1). The testing meth-
od is based on the vulnerability scanning of the ECDIS 
using an industry leading software tool. The detected vul-
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nerabilities are analyzed in the context of the shipboard 
environment and mitigation solutions are discussed. 
2 Shipboard ECDIS
The ECDIS that is IMO type approved displays central-
ly updated Electronic Navigational Chart (ENC) together 
with sensor data from mandatory position, heading and 
speed source shipboard sensors (IHO, 2018; IMO, 2017c). 
Additional sensor data (radar, AIS, Navtex…) are integrat-
ed in the ECDIS depending on the ship`s safety and other 
factors. The ECDIS represents an equivalent to paper 
charts and with adequate backup arrangement allows for 
the paperless navigation (IMO, 2017c; Brčić and Žuškin, 
2018; Weintrit, 2018). The ECDIS is mandatory for all 
ships engaged in international trade since the year 2018 
(SOLAS, 2009). 
The tested ECDIS is of Wärtsilä Transas manufacturer, 
model Navi Sailor 4000. The ECDIS is type approved in the 
year 2016 and was installed on board of the ship in March 
2019. Technical specification of the ECDIS is shown in 
Table 1.
Table 1 The shipboard ECDIS specification.
ECDIS Manufacturer Wärtsilä Transas
Model Navi Sailor 4000
Software version 3.00.340
USCG approval 165.123/33/0
Approval date July 2016
Installation date March 2019
Charts IHO RNC IHO S-57
IHO RNC IHO S-61
IHO Chart Content IHO S-52
IHO Data Protection IHO S-63
Interfaces Serial NMEA IEC61162-1




Figure 2 Architecture of the shipboard ECDIS.
Source: Authors
Figure 1 Training and research ship Kraljica mora.
Source: Ministry of the Sea, Transport and Infrastructure, https://mmpi.
gov.hr
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the tested ECDIS. 
The ECDIS is operating in the stand-alone configuration. 
The mandatory sensors data (positioning, heading and 
speed information) are gathered directly via the serial 
NMEA interfaces (standard IEC 61162) and the additional 
sensors data (AIS and NAVTEX) are gathered via Ethernet 
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network using a data collector unit for the serial connec-
tion of NMEA sensors.
3 Cyber security testing
The cyber security testing of the ECDIS was performed 
using the industry most widely used vulnerability scan-
ner, the Nessus Professional version 8.0.1 (Nessus, 2019). 
The vulnerability scanning is a computational method of 
detecting cyber vulnerabilities, which are known not only 
to the manufactures of the software and the underlying 
operating system, but also to potential attackers (Svilicic 
et al., 2019c; Svilicic et al., 2018). Figure 3 shows the test-
ing setup. A laptop with the Nessus Professional vulner-
ability scanner is directly connected to the ECDIS using an 
Ethernet cross cable. Despite the fact that the vulnerability 
scanning is a passive process, the ship was docked during 
the testing.
The test results are shown on Figure 4. In total, fifteen 
vulnerabilities were detected, from which four vulner-
abilities were assigned under the high severity and eleven 
vulnerabilities under medium severity. From 36 pieces 
of information, the key one is that the ECDIS software is 
running on the Microsoft Windows 7 Professional oper-
ating system. While the underlying operating system was 
timely updated with the service pack 1 and other security 
patches, the support for this version of the operating sys-
tem will end before the end of the current year (Microsoft, 
2019). This implies that the manufacturer will not release 
security patches for newly discovered vulnerabilities.
The detected vulnerabilities are listed in Table 2. All 
of the detected vulnerabilities with the high severity are 
related to a web server running on the ECDIS (Table 2, 
vulnerabilities 1-4). The web server detected is a free-
ly available software provided by the Apache Software 
Foundation, and in our case represents the third-party 
component of the ECDIS software. The version of the web 
server is Apache 2.2, which is obsolete by its provider 
since December 2017 (Apache, 2019). As in the case of 
Figure 3 The cyber security testing setup.
Source: Authors
Figure 4 Summary report of the vulnerability scan.
Source: Authors
Table 2 Detected ECDIS cyber vulnerabilities.
Service Vulnerability description Severity
1-4 Web server The version of the Apache web server running on the ECDIS is obsolete and no longer maintained 
the manufacturer. 
HighThe version of the Apache web server running on the ECDIS is affected by multiple vulnerabilities. 
An attacker could cause a denial of service condition, gain unauthorised access or cause the ECDIS 
to crash.
5-14 Web server The version of the Apache web server running on the ECDIS is affected by multiple 
vulnerabilities. An attacker could cause a denial of service condition, execute code, obtain 
sensitive information, execute cross-site scripting attacks or cause the ECDIS to crash. Medium
15 File/printer 
sharing 
Signing is not required on the Microsoft Server Message Block (SMB) service version 1. An 




The ECDIS is running Microsoft Windows 7 Professional version of the underlying operating system.
Info
A file/print sharing service based on Microsoft Server Message Block version 1 protocol is running 
on the ECDIS.
Identification of services running on the ECDIS is possible.
Source: Authors
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Microsoft operating system, Apache community does not 
provide support for this version of the web server, allow-
ing an attacker to exploit newly discovered and known 
vulnerabilities. In addition, the support relies on help from 
the community members who work as volunteers. The 
provider’s recommended solution for the detected vul-
nerabilities is migration to the actual version of the web 
server. 
From the eleven medium severity vulnerabilities de-
tected, ten are also related to the third-party web server 
running on the ECDIS (Table 2, vulnerabilities 5-14). One 
of the medium severity vulnerabilities detected (Table 2, 
vulnerability 15) is related to the underlying operating 
system and its standard component, the Server Message 
Block (SMB) version 1. The SMB provides file/printer 
sharing service. Despite the fact that the Microsoft operat-
ing system is updated with the timely security patches, the 
manufacturer`s recommendation is to use newer versions 
of the SMB due to lack of security features implemented in 
the version 1 (Microsoft, 2018). 
4 Results and discussion
Even the cyber security test allows for detection of 
all know vulnerabilities existing in the ECDIS, the re-
sults could reflect incorrectly the real severity of threats 
due to specifics of the shipboard operating environment. 
Therefore, the test results are analyzed regarding the im-
plemented protection measures on the ship. The imple-
mented protections were identified by interviewing the 
ship’s navigational ranks. The protections include the 
physical access controls for unauthorized personnel that 
are implemented, security procedures that are adhered, 
the crew is trained by the ECDIS’s vendor, ENCs are up-
dated in controlled manner with an USB memory stick 
provided by the manufacture, and the ship is continuously 
assessed. The identified cyber threats from the ECDIS’s 
third-party components together with the description and 
possible solution are listed in Table 3. 
In total, three cyber threats are identified, from which 
all are related to the maintenance of the ECDIS software’s 
third-party components, in particular the fact that the 
third-party components are abandoned, out of date and 
insecurely setup. As the ECDIS is operating in the stand-
alone configuration without connection to the Internet 
or an internal ship network, the identified threats repre-
sent risks that are acceptable for a short time, but require 
development of the mitigation plan. The threats’ solving 
solutions include migration from the obsolete to actual 
version of the third-party components, patching with se-
curity updates released by the manufacturer and secure 
setup of the third-party components. It is important to 
point out that these maintenance activities not only of 
the ECDIS software’s third-party components, but also of 
the underlying operating system (in our case in the close 
future, as shown in Chapter 3) could affect negatively the 
ECDIS software functionality, and therefore are to be done 
by the ECDIS manufacturer authorized personnel. 
The results show that despite the fact that the ship-
board ECDIS is the type approved, with the latest version 
of the ECDIS software, and running on the updated under-
lying operating system, significant cyber weaknesses exist 
on the ECDIS due to unmaintained ECDIS software’s third-
party components. It is worth noting that the web server 
features are not necessary needed for the regulated ECDIS 
software functionality, particularly not for the operation 
in the stand-alone configuration. This together with the 
significant risk from the cyber vulnerabilities suggest that 
the third-party components should not be used in the soft-
ware’s development process of the critical ship navigation 
systems.
5 Conclusion
The cyber security analysis of the ECDIS software’s 
third-party components is presented. The analysis is 
based on the cyber security testing of the shipboard ECDIS 
with an industry leading vulnerability scanner. Three cy-
ber threats identified that require development of the 
mitigation plan are related to the maintenance of ECDIS 
software’s third-party components, in particular the mi-
gration to the actual version, patching with security up-
dates and secure setup. The results suggest that even 
the ECDIS software and underlying operating system are 
maintained, the system could be vulnerable due to weak-
nesses in the ECDIS software’s third-party components. 
Table 3 Cyber threats from ECDIS’s third-party components.
Threat Description Possible solution1 Third-party 
components abandoned
Allows for the exploitation of well known 
vulnerabilities of the ECDIS software’s third-party 
components
The third-party components’ migration to a 
version recommended by the manufacturer
2 Third-party components 
out of date
Allows for the exploitation of well known 
vulnerabilities of the ECDIS software’s third-party 
components
Patching of the third-party components with 
the provider’s security updates
3 Third-party components 
insecure setup
Allows for the exploitation of default setup with no 
security features activated
Secure setup of the  
third-party components
Source: Authors
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The presented study contributes to development of the 
upcoming maritime standard IEC 63154 and indicates the 
testing results that should be targeted. The obtained re-
sults contribute to knowledge of ECDIS cyber security and 
are applicable to any shipboard navigation system.
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